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a b s t r a c t
Intermediaries play an important role in disseminating national Occupational Health and Safety (OHS)
programmes to small businesses but not much is known about the factors that inﬂuence their role.
The aim of this paper is to elucidate the factors that inﬂuence intermediaries’ contribution to the trans-
formation and dissemination of a national OHS programme for small business that built on an insurance
incentive scheme – the New Zealand Workplace Safety Discount scheme.
It is a case study of this scheme implementation in the agriculture sector. Data was collected from
scheme documentation and semi-structured interviews with the scheme owner, representatives from
intermediary groups and the targeted small businesses. The interviews were tape recorded, transcribed
and thematically analysed in relation to the scheme’s programme theory.
The intermediaries introduced new programme mechanisms and recruitment strategies that were not
considered in the design. These were shaped by the intermediaries’ understanding of the target group and
by their own business interest. To engage Non-Governmental Intermediaries the scheme owner had to
establish a close relation to them and to link the aim of the scheme to the intermediaries’ business goal.
The scheme had different beneﬁts for the various types of intermediaries and this determined their con-
tributions. In that way they reached different parts of the target group. Even though the intermediaries
played an active role, the outreach was still limited.
This highlights the importance of analysing the business interests of intermediaries and their client
groups when identifying intermediaries to integrate into OHS schemes for small businesses.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that national Occupational Health and
Safety (OHS) intervention programmes have difﬁculties in reaching
and being implemented in small businesses (SBs). Thus there is a
need to design speciﬁc interventions that work in the context of
SBs (Baldock et al., 2006; Champoux and Brun, 2003; Fairman
and Yapp, 2005; Hasle et al., 2012a; Hasle and Limborg, 2006; Legg
et al., 2010; Olsen et al., 2010, 2012). Over the last 10–20 years,
governmental agencies in many countries have started to design
OHS intervention programmes speciﬁcally for SBs. Intervention
programmes range, inter alia, from information material (Caple
et al., 1997), internet based hazard management tools (Antonsson
and Alvarez, 2005) to free consultancy (Caple, 2006), insurance
schemes (Department of Labour, 2006) and prevention packages
(Hasle et al., 2012a). Many of these programmes have been criti-
cised for not being designed with a proper understanding of the
SB’s context and for not being evaluated properly (Hasle and
Limborg, 2006; Legg et al., 2009, 2010; Walters, 2006). Only a
few successful interventions have been identiﬁed (MacEachen
et al., 2010).
Even well designed government OHS programmes have difﬁcul-
ties reaching out to a larger number of SBs. The main reasons are
the high cost of delivering the programme through personal con-
tact, which is preferred by SBs (Hasle et al., 2012a,b; Hasle and
Limborg, 2006; Olsen et al., 2010; Persson, 1991), and the fact that
many SBs are reluctant to interact with OHS authorities (Hasle and
Limborg, 2006; Olsen et al., 2010). The SBs may not even be aware
of their needs and seldom actively seek information about health
and safety programmes. It has therefore been suggested that OHS
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2014.02.015
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programmes should be promoted and disseminated by existing
trusted intermediaries in order to reach out to the community of
SBs (Haslam et al., 1998; Hasle and Limborg, 2006; Lamm, 1997;
Olsen et al., 2010; Tait andWalker, 2000; Walters, 2001). Many dif-
ferent actors (organisations or individuals) can function as inter-
mediaries. However very little is known about how they fulﬁl
their role and inﬂuence the dissemination and implementation of
the programmes.
This paper focuses on the Non-Government Organisation (NGO)
intermediaries and the possibilities that exist for developing pro-
grammes which work systematically with such intermediaries.
An intermediary in this paper is deﬁned as an organisation or per-
son who does not have ownership of the programme or constitutes
part of the target group for the programme but who conveys or
potentially can convey the programme to the target group.
As NGO intermediaries are not funded by the Government
agency, it is necessary to consider the relation between the agency
and intermediaries as a social exchange where both parties devel-
op an understanding and interest in a joint cause. For an employer
or business association it can be a matter of representing the inter-
est of the members, for example in discussions about new regula-
tion or enforcement practices. Such organisations may also have
certain informational services for their members but it cannot be
expected that they have the resources for actually implementing
a programme. That would normally require additional funding
from the government, which may happen though direct grants or
various incentives. It is often the lack of sustainable funding sys-
tems which cause many promising pilot projects aimed at SBs to
fail (Hasle and Limborg, 2006). In this paper we provide an analysis
of the role of intermediaries and the mechanisms which inﬂuence
the way the programme works in a government OHS programme –
the New Zealand Workplace Safety Discount (WSD) scheme. This
scheme was chosen because it provided a basic funding of interme-
diaries’ activities.
The analysis contributes to our knowledge about the factors
that inﬂuence intermediaries and how they contribute to dissemi-
nation and implementation of OHS intervention programmes. The
paper analyses how the mechanisms of the New Zealand WSD
scheme are adjusted and how this adjustment is inﬂuenced by
intermediaries through the implementation process. The analysis
is based on a case study of the scheme in the agricultural sector.
We show how a well-designed scheme depends on the activities
of intermediaries who ‘carry’ the scheme to the farmers, how the
intermediaries develop their own versions of the scheme depend-
ing on their experience, motivation and resources to support the
scheme. Further, the inﬂuence of the relations between the govern-
ment body responsible for the scheme, intermediaries and target
group on the uptake of the scheme are considered. Finally, the
infrastructure’s ability to maintain the intermediary’s interest in
the scheme is discussed.
We commence by describing the present knowledge about the
role of intermediaries in SB programmes and about OHS insurance
programmes. It is followed by a presentation of the theoretical
approach which is built on realist analysis. Then we present the re-
search as a case study design, methods and materials, followed by
what we found in relation to the revealed programme theory, how
the scheme was implemented in the agriculture sector, the role of
the intermediaries in relation to their incentives to engage in the
programme and their transformational activities, and identiﬁed
opportunities to engage other intermediaries. The discussion fo-
cuses on the role of intermediaries and their active transformation
of the mechanism of the scheme into something they believe may
be successful and useful for themselves and the SBs. Finally we
point out implications of the study for further research and for
practice.
2. Background
2.1. Reaching out to small business
Previous research has identiﬁed distinctive internal and exter-
nal contextual factors that explain why small businesses have dif-
ﬁculties managing OHS (for a discussion see Hasle et al. (2012a)).
This paper focusses on the intermediaries’ role in reaching the SBs.
Use of intermediaries to support the outreach of OHS pro-
grammes for SBs has been discussed by several researchers. Some
have mapped the SBs’ use of intermediaries especially in relation to
distribution of OHS information and advice (Antonsson et al., 2002;
Eakin and Weir, 1995; Haslam et al., 1998; Hasle, 2000; James
et al., 2004; Lamm, 1997; Walters, 2001). In these studies labour
inspectors were identiﬁed as the most important provider of OHS
information, and they can in this respect be considered as interme-
diaries, but they are also part of the governmental enforcement
system and therefore often met with reservation (Hasle and Lim-
borg, 2006; Olsen et al., 2010). In this paper we focus on the
NGO intermediaries which are not part of the enforcement system.
Next to labour inspectors, the use of intermediaries depended on
the national context. In some countries OHS advisory services were
institutionalised and funded commonly in the form of occupational
health services securing a basic service to SBs (Antonsson et al.,
2002; Mizoue et al., 1999; Walters, 2001). However SB are reluc-
tant to pay for such services, which therefore depend on some kind
of external funding (Hasle and Limborg, 2006), that can be difﬁcult
to secure in many countries (For a discussion Cunningham et al.,
2013). No matter whether OHS services are available or not, SBs
are often not aware that they perform below compliance level
and are in need of OHS advice (Olsen et al., 2010) and therefore
rarely seek assistance on their own initiative. Thus OHS pro-
grammes need to be actively ‘carried to’ SBs.
In countries without institutionalised OHS services, SBs will de-
pend on other types of intermediaries to provide information and
assistance. It can be accountants (Hasle et al., 2010; Lamm,
1997), regional health and safety representatives (Frick and Walt-
ers, 1998) and a wide variety of NGOs (Hasle and Limborg, 2006;
Walters, 2001) like employers and business associations, trade un-
ions, suppliers of materials and equipment, training providers, and
networks or local communities of owner-managers (Hasle et al.,
2012b). With no speciﬁc services available these types of interme-
diaries are often included as key actors in national strategies
(James et al., 2004; Legg et al., 2010). The strength of using such
established intermediaries is that they are not part of government
enforcement and that they have already developed trust and good-
will from the SB. However, it is not certain that the intermediary
organisations have the interest and funds to serve SBs on occupa-
tional health and safety issues. It is therefore important to learn
how NGO intermediaries can be engaged in OHS. It should happen
in such a way that the interest can be sustained and funding se-
cured without losing the SB’s trust and goodwill. With one recent
exception (Cunningham et al., 2013) the strategies to achieve such
a goal is not discussed in the literature.
2.2. Insurance related schemes
A particular type of OHS intervention programme is insurance
premium-related incentive schemes. They are implemented in
many countries for larger ﬁrms (Clayton, 2012; Elsler et al.,
2010) where the premium is graded according to claim experience.
However, SBs have often been excluded from these programmes
because the chance of an injury occurring in a particular SB has
been considered as low, even though the risk of injuries is high
(Elsler et al., 2010; Hasle et al., 2009). Another reason for excluding
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SBs from experience grading schemes is that a SB which experi-
ences just one injury would face serious economic consequences
(Clayton, 2012). Some countries have introduced opportunities
for SBs to apply for grants for particular improvements but even
though funds were raised through the insurance system, these
schemes tended to result in isolated one-off improvements (Elsler
et al., 2010). Also, for the reasons mentioned at the beginning of
Section 2.1, insurance programmes need to be ‘carried to’ the
SBs. They cannot be expected to search for such an opportunity
by themselves.
In 2006 the New Zealand Accident Compensation Corporation
(ACC) introduced one of the few examples of an insurance incen-
tive scheme – the Workplace Safety Discount (WSD) scheme. It
gives SBs a reduction in insurance premiums for a certain level of
OHS management performance. Speciﬁcally, the scheme gives a
10% reduction in the insurance levy for SBs in high risk sectors
when their OHS management practices are at a level where they
are able to identify and control the main hazards in the industry,
investigate and record injuries and they have emergency plans
and involve their employees. The dissemination of the WSD
scheme was particularly designed to rely on NGO intermediaries
that already had contact with SBs in the high risk sectors.
2.2.1. Introduction to the WSD scheme
The WSD scheme was introduced in 2006 because another OHS
incentive insurance programme introduced by ACC ﬁve years ear-
lier was perceived to be inaccessible for SBs. The reasons for this
were that it was considered to have too extensive requirements
for documented OHS management systems, including a formal
external audit every two years (Department of Labour, 2006). This
view is supported in the literature (Santos et al., 2013). ACC
wanted to develop a similar incentive scheme for SBs in high risk
sectors because they were perceived to have higher injury rates
and higher cost of claims compared to medium and large busi-
nesses. ACC believed that this was due to SB owner’s having a
low level of health and safety awareness and poor hazard manage-
ment practice (Department of Labour, 2006; Olsen et al., 2012).
This view is also supported in the research literature (Hasle
et al., 2012a; Hasle and Limborg, 2006).The aim of theWSD scheme
was to reduce the number and severity of injuries and diseases in
SBs in high risk sectors and make ongoing improvements in OHS
management capability and practices in these businesses (personal
communication with ACC injury prevention manager 29 March
2010) (Department of Labour, 2006).
The WSD scheme was open to SBs with fewer than 10 employ-
ees in speciﬁc high risk subsectors of agriculture, forestry, con-
struction, road freight, motor trades and inshore ﬁshing. SBs in
these sectors could apply for 10% reduction of their ACC levies if
they fulﬁlled three requirements: that they (1) demonstrated from
training or prior learning, industry-relevant capability in hazard
identiﬁcation and management, injury and incident investigation,
emergency readiness and employee training; (2) satisfactorily
ﬁlled in a self-assessment form about their OHS management prac-
tice; (3) accepted the possibility of an audit by an independent
auditor approved by ACC. The ﬁrst requirement could be fulﬁlled
by attending two half-day training courses developed by ACC in
co-operation with the industry in focus. The training courses were
free, delivered locally by ACC approved training organisations and
developed in co-operation with ACC’s industry programmemanag-
ers and the industry. The self-assessment form was developed in
co-operation between Department of Labour, ACC, the industries
and the approved training organisations. SBs were selected for
audits if their self-assessment was unsatisfactory. Additionally,
approximately 15% of applications were randomly selected for
audit by ACC. The WSD scheme was promoted primarily by the se-
lected training organisations and secondarily on ACC’s webpage.
Thus intermediaries speciﬁc to each industry were involved
in the industry speciﬁc design, promotion and delivery of the
scheme.
2.3. Realist evaluation theory
It has recently been suggested that realist evaluation theory
(Pawson, 2006; Pawson and Tilley, 1997) could be used as an
important analytical tool for research in OHS intervention pro-
grammes (Pedersen et al., 2012) and for research in SBs (Olsen
et al., 2012; Hasle et al., 2012a). The basic idea is to study how,
for whom and under which circumstances a programme works.
The key concept is that a programme needs to have a mechanism
that will make the target group in a speciﬁc context make changes
resulting in the desired outcome. The model is: Mechanism + Con-
texts = Outcome. The point of departure in interventions is a pro-
gramme theory, which is an assumption about how the
programme will work. The assumption is about the mechanisms
that in a speciﬁc context will reach out to and motivate the target
group to make changes that should result in the desired outcome
(Bickmann, 1987; Pawson, 2006) (see Fig. 1).
Intervention programmes are embedded in social systems
where the involved stakeholders such as intermediaries inﬂuence
and change the programme in accordance with their interpretation
of the programme. How the intermediaries inﬂuences the pro-
gramme theory will depend on their role in the development and
discrimination of the programme, their perception of and relation
to the target group and the external and internal contextual factors
inﬂuencing their interest in the programme. Fig. 2 illustrates how
the programme theory underlying the intervention programme
can be inﬂuenced by intermediaries and changed so that the
programme actually delivered to the target group differs from
the programme theory of the programme owners. It shows that
the Programme developer needs to have a programme theory (de-
picted by the clouds in Fig. 2) that includes the Context (C) and
Mechanism (M) that should make the intermediaries engage in
the delivery of the programme and how the Intermediaries en-
gaged in a programme can modify or transform the programme
theory from one assumption of the context and mechanism
(C1 + M1) to another (C2 + M2).
It is the intermediaries’ role in the transformation of the pro-
gramme theory, and the resulting mechanisms facilitating or limit-
ing the delivery of the programme to the target group which is the
focus of this paper.
2.4. Aim of the study
The overall aim of the study is to understand the role of inter-
mediaries in the transformation, implementation and dissemina-
tion of national OHS programmes into practice. The speciﬁc aim
is to answer the following two questions: (1) How do intermediar-
ies contribute to the transformation of the programme theory
(understanding of context and mechanism) in the WSD scheme
during implementation in the agriculture sector? (2) What factors
inﬂuence intermediaries’ transformation of the programme and
the effort they put into the promotion and dissemination of the
elements of the WSD scheme?
3. Methods
The study explores the implementation of the WSD programme
in a qualitative case study of the agriculture sector. This sector was
chosen because it had the highest numbers of SBs eligible to join
the programme and is an important economic sector in New
Zealand.
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Data collection was organised in accordance with the pro-
gramme chain from programme owner (ACC), through involved
stakeholders (e.g. OHS training providers and ﬁnancial advisors)
to the receiver of the programme (the farmers). Data included doc-
uments and webpages describing the programme. The documents
included written material from ACC as the owner of the scheme
about justiﬁcation for the development, content, evaluations and
uptake and from intermediaries about the elements they delivered.
Data also included the outcomes of semi-structured interviews con-
ductedwith key people (fromACC, intermediaries and participating
farmers) involved in the various stages of design, development,
delivery and uptake of the WSD scheme for the agriculture sector.
Interview guides were prepared according to the role of the
interviewee. They generally covered the following topics: the
interviewee’s role and involvement in WSD scheme (identiﬁcation
of intermediaries role and contextual factors inﬂuencing the role),
perception of other actors’ role in the implementation of WSD
(identiﬁcation of intermediaries role and contextual factors
inﬂuencing the role), knowledge of the background for scheme,
knowledge and perception of the elements of WSD (identiﬁcation
of programme theory mechanism of the element and contextual
factors for farmers), how the elements were adjusted and imple-
mented and how well they worked (identiﬁcation of change in
programme and in programme theory and contextual factors for
intermediaries and farmers), how WSD were promoted and
disseminated, and about the uptake and effect of WSD.
3.1. Participants
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key represen-
tatives from all links in the chain from ACC to farmers. Altogether
15 interviews were carried out, each lasting 1–1½ h. They included
the senior manager in the ACC injury prevention department who
participated in the design of the WSD scheme; ACC’s programme
manager for the WSD programme; ACC’s agriculture industry pro-
gramme manager; one ACC injury prevention consultant for the
agriculture industry; the Manager of FarmSafe; three FarmSafe
trainers; one ﬁnancial advisor promoting the WSD amongst farm-
ers; ﬁve farmers that had applied for the WSD and achieved the
discount; and one WSD auditor. The interviews were conducted
at a place chosen by the interviewees. Representatives from ACC,
the auditor and the ﬁnancial advisor chose to be interviewed at
their workplace. The farmers and two trainers chose their home.
The third trainer chose to be interviewed at a café.
Interviewees were purposefully sampled (Carpentier-Roy et al.,
2001; Sandelowski, 2000) to take into account different types of
intermediaries, the trainers geographical placement and the spread
of their clients/networks and farmers different approaches to OHS
and different types agriculture subsector. The actual selection was
mainly by snowball sampling (Atkinson and Flint, 2004). The ACC
senior manager, WSD programme manager and ACC agriculture
industry manager were selected because they all had central roles
in the design, development and running of WSD. FarmSafe was se-
lected as the central organisation involved in design, development
and dissemination of WSD in agriculture. FarmSafe trainers, ﬁve
farmers and one ﬁnancial advisor were selected by snowballing.
The FarmSafe manager suggested and facilitated contact to trainers
who facilitated the contact to the ﬁnancial advisor and ﬁve farmers.
The local ACC ofﬁce facilitated the contact to a local WSD auditor.
All interviews were conducted between April and July 2011. A sum-
mary of interviewees’ background is presented in Tables 1 and 2.
3.2. Analysis
Interviews were transcribed and coded in a qualitative data















Fig. 1. The programme theory representing the developers’ assumption about the contextual factors under which the chosen mechanisms should inﬂuence SB to make



















Fig. 2. Schematic illustration of how intermediaries can modify or transform the programme developers programme theory (depicted by the clouds) from one assumption of
the context and mechanism (C1 + M1) to another (C2 + M2).
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conducted in relation to the theory of realist evaluation (Pawson,
2006; Pawson and Tilley, 1997) in order to understand the mech-
anisms involved in the transformation of the programme from cre-
ation through development, dissemination and implementation.
The material was thematically analysed (Braun and Clarke,
2006) speciﬁcally focusing on:
1. The programme theory behind the development of the ACC
WSD scheme.
2. Intermediaries understanding of the mechanisms that encour-
aged farmers to join the scheme, attend training courses and
implement changes to improve the working environment.
3. Intermediaries’ inﬂuence on and modiﬁcation of the
programme.
4. The motives and interests of the intermediaries causing them to
act in certain ways related to implementation of the
programme.
Triangulation between the different informants and interviews
and documents was used to assess the validity of the identiﬁed
mechanisms and contextual factors and interest. It was done in
accordance with Maxwell’s suggestion for realist analysis of quali-
tative research (Maxwell, 2012).
4. Results
4.1. The programme theory of the WSD scheme
The programme theory that ACC used to design the WSD
scheme is not directly outlined in the ofﬁcial documents from
ACC. Thus information was extracted from documents and inter-
views with ACC ofﬁcials about the mechanisms that should make
SBs join the scheme and make changes, and the understanding of
the SB’s context. The programme theory was based on a prior
assumption that implementing systematic hazard management,
investigating injury, preparing for emergencies and training
employees will improve the working environment and reduce inju-
ries or improve health. Building on this prior assumption the re-
sults of our analysis is outlined for each design feature of the
WSD scheme in Table 3. The design features of the scheme are
listed in the left column. The underlying reasons for giving priority
to these features are listed in the middle column (context). The
right column outlines the basic mechanisms that should make
the SB owners join the scheme and make changes in their business.
The uptake of the scheme was lower than originally expected by
the designers. After the ﬁrst year (2007) 1735 ﬁrms had joined the
scheme. ACC’s target was 3300 ﬁrms out of the 165,250 estimated
Table 1
Background data for interviewees representing authorities and intermediaries.
Interviewee Organisation Role in WSD Background
ACC Injury prevention manager ACC Initiation, design, justiﬁcation OHS professional, previously worked in DOL
ACC WSD programme manager ACC Management of WSD scheme 10+ Years in ACC as programme manager
ACC Agriculture industry
programme manager
ACC Development of WSD in agriculture,
cooperating with FarmSafe and Farmers
associations
10+ Years in ACC employed to develop and
promote injury prevention programmes in
agriculture
ACC injury prevention consultant ACC Attended some WSD workshops General
contact to small businesses that wanted advice
on injury prevention
(no information available)
FarmSafe manager FarmSafe Participated in development of WSD in
agriculture, Managed FarmSafe’s regional
advisors and trainers
Involved in the establishment of FarmSafe
FarmSafe trainer 1 North Island Independent OHS agriculture
consultant
Had conducted FarmSafe Awareness and Plans
courses since their inception
Started own safety consultancy in agriculture
in 1995 to help farmers implement safety
management. Clients geographically close
FarmSafe trainer 2 South Island Independent OSH, agriculture
consultant
Involved in development of FarmSafe Was the CEO of the tertiary training
organisation that was one of the founders of
FarmSafe. Clients geographically widespread
FarmSafe trainer 3 North Island Independent OHS agriculture
consultant
Helped develop FarmSafe Awareness and Plans
courses, had conducted approximately 20 and
2 courses respectively and 5 WSD workshops
Chair of Health and Safety Committee in New
Zealand Shearing industry. Started as a Sheep
Shearer
Financial advisor Independent advisor Recruited farmers to apply for WSD and to
attend the WSD workshop (charged NZ$100
per participant)
Degree in farm management. Worked in
insurance industry since 1987. Had a lot of
clients and family in farming. Knew the
FarmSafe Manager and WSD trainer personally
WSD Auditor Independent OHS advisor Became an ACC accredited auditor in 2009 Occupational Health nurse. Completed an
Audit course in 2003 and had since done 10
WSD audits
Table 2
Background data for interviewee farmers.
Farm type No. employees The farmers’ background
Beef and horticulture 3 Fulltime family, 10 casual Always worked on farms, self-taught
Dairy 1 4 Family, 1 fulltime, 1 part time Originally milk tank driver, went into share milking then
became full time. Had completed farm management and technical courses
Horticulture 3 Family, 1 fulltime, 2 casual plus 15 casual (November–February) Started part-time in horticulture and part-time managing a farm,
took over from his father
Dairy 2 2 Family, 3 fulltime Both (husband and wife) had university degrees, she in agriculture
and he in science and business. He grew up on a farm
Sheep and beef 2 Family, contractors Been a farmer all his life
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eligible businesses (Accident Compensation Corporation, ND). The
number of SBs joining the scheme has since grown steadily but at a
rather slow rate. In 2011, 3357 SBs had joined the scheme. This
was around a third of what ACC predicted the uptake would be
in 2009 (9300 SBs) (Department of Labour, 2006; Teng, 2011).
ACC has not been able to measure the effects on the SBs in
terms of reduction in injury claim rates. It has not experienced a
reduction in claims, but the ACC WSD programme manager indi-
cated that this could be due to more SBs becoming aware that they
could make claims when injured. The injury claims rate is also con-
sidered to be a problematic outcome measure (Shannon et al.,
1999). ACC reported a reduction in the number of injuries among
SBs participating in the scheme (Accident Compensation Corpora-
tion, 2009) but did not present any supporting evidence. It was the
ACC Injury prevention consultant’s impression that the main
changes implemented in SBs after attending training courses were
increased training of staff and implementation of hazard manage-
ment and injury investigation.
4.2. Implementation of WSD in the agriculture sector
ACC’s agriculture programme management team, Federated
Farmers (the industry association for farmers), the agriculture
industry training organisation and FarmSafe (an agriculture indus-
try OHS training provider established by the three ﬁrst mentioned
organisations) formed a group to tailor WSD to agriculture. Farm-
Safe was chosen as the primary promoter of WSD and the primary
training provider. Two types of training were accepted as demon-
stration of capability of OHS management. The preferred training
was two of the established FarmSafe courses: ‘FarmSafe awareness’
(half-day) and ‘FarmSafe plans’ (one day) already delivered by
FarmSafe. The less preferred option by FarmSafe and ACC’s agricul-
ture manager was a half-day WSD workshop designed by ACC. The
FarmSafe courses were preferred by the ACC agriculture manager
because they were found to reach a large part of the farming com-
munity (Morgaine et al., 2006) and perceived to be effective. The
FarmSafe courses were funded by the Ministry of Education until
April 2011 and were free to attend. TheWSDworkshop was funded
by ACC and free for farmers eligible for the WSD scheme. FarmSafe
began to deliver this workshop by the end of 2010, just before the
funding for the FarmSafe courses ended. The audience for the
FarmSafe courses was wider than for the WSD workshop. The
ACC Agriculture programme manager saw FarmSafe as having
some sort of inﬂuence on the initiation of the WSD programme
in general and in agriculture in particular:
‘‘FarmSafe was where it all started. There was the FarmSafe Aware-
ness and FarmSafe Plans and FarmSafe skills courses were up and
running well before the WSD came into being. We saw value in
having some small incentive for farmers to come to the workshops
and so I think the initial thinking was it was about motivating peo-
ple to attend the training because we saw the training as valu-
able.... I think the idea was that rather than give those things
[voucher worth NZ$40-50 for safety equipment] we should give
people some sort of a discount on their levies if they’re doing the
right thing and so that turned into be the Workplace Safety Dis-
count programme’’.
FarmSafe did not directly employ trainers but it contracted
trainers who were mostly local OHS/agriculture consultants based
throughout New Zealand farming communities. It mainly relied on
these local trainers to contact the farmers and deliver the courses.
These trainers based their livelihoods on the delivery of FarmSafe
training courses and other OHS consultancies. Some were farmers
themselves. Fig. 3 illustrates the WSD programme development
and dissemination in the agriculture industry. The Auditor and
the application process are not included in Fig. 3.
When WSD was introduced the scheme was promoted by ACC’s
agriculture group who ran campaigns in the agriculture sector’s
magazines focusing on stories about the economic and social con-
sequences of injures for farmers. The campaigns encouraged farm-
ers to manage health and safety and take FarmSafe training
courses, thereby indirectly promoting WSD (as indicated by the
ACC agriculture programme manager). Promotion of the scheme
in agriculture was through FarmSafe and particularly the local
trainers and was as follows. ACC ﬁnancially supported FarmSafe’s
promotion of the two training courses and WSD scheme in the ﬁrst
Table 3
Design features of the WDS scheme with the related contextual features and change mechanisms.
WSD design feature Context Mechanism
10% Levy discount SB perceive ACC levy as a burden. They do not have much money Incentive (economic) to join the scheme
and to fulﬁl the scheme’s requirements
Demonstrate OHS capability SB owners have poor OHS knowledge and practice. They need to
show that they have good knowledge and practice
Control
Training courses Knowledge is brought to SBs. They want to be good employers and
will make changes if necessary
Information provision
½ Day courses SB owners do not have much time. ½ day courses are minimal time
requirements
No course fee SB do not have much money Economic incentive
Locally delivered Limited time and money required for travel. Convenience
Delivered by industry providers They are known by SB owners and trusted. They know how to
reach SB owners.
Trust
Self-assessment of OHS management practice SB owners need to show they have capability to manage OHS (they
generally do not). Little time resources. More informal than
documenting an OHS management system (also an encouragement
to make change)
Control
Possibility of an OHS audit SB owners would maybe cheat. SB owners would maybe not make
sufﬁcient changes
Control/punishment
Promotion of the scheme
Information letter to all eligible SBs from ACC SB react to a written letter about the 10% levy Knowledge about levy makes SB join the
scheme
Industry speciﬁc promotion by ACC’s industry
injury prevention departments and industry
stakeholders involved in the programme
They know the speciﬁc external and internal context of SBs in the
sector and can design promotion to ﬁt these SBs. This presumes
that the stakeholders have an interest in the WSD scheme e.g.
funding of workshops
For workshop providers: ﬁnancial
incentive. For industry associations:
ﬁnancial incentive for their members
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years. Since then FarmSafe had to ﬁnance the promotion itself.
From 2010 ACC organised regional meetings with ﬁnancial advis-
ors. The purpose was to convince the ﬁnancial advisors to promote
ACC’s products including the WSD scheme (and indicated by the
Financial advisor).
The numbers of small farmers that obtained WSD grew slowly
during the ﬁrst four to ﬁve years. Thereafter it seems to have stag-
nated around 1% of the eligible farmers (Table 4). The uptake in
agriculture was much lower than ACC expected but the attendance
on FarmSafe courses was considered by ACC to be satisfactory. Be-
tween 2002 and 2010, 4862 farmers attended the FarmSafe course,
four times as many as obtained the WSD discount (Teng, 2011).
The ACC agriculture manager initiated a survey in 2010 to ﬁnd
out why farmers attended FarmSafe courses and then subsequently
may not have applied for the WSD. The survey found that 40% at-
tended courses because they wanted to be responsible employers,
20% because they thought it was an OHS requirement (e.g. fear of
prosecution), and only 7% because they wanted a discount on their
ACC levy. Based on this information, the ACC Agriculture manager
concluded that the uptake of theWSDwas low because farmers did
not see the 10% reduction as a sufﬁcient economic incentive and
because they had to be away from the farm to attend the course.
In contrast to this, the ﬁve interviewed farmers that joined the
WSD saw the 10% discount as an incentive to join but they also
emphasised that either being a good employer or avoiding prose-
cution motivated them to join (Olsen et al., 2013).
4.3. The role of intermediaries in the agricultural sector
4.3.1. Incentives for intermediaries
Two types of incentives were found to motivate intermediaries
to promote the training courses and the WSD: (1) An economic
incentive which was needed to cover actual costs and make it
worth the effort for the intermediaries to promote the scheme, re-
cruit, conduct training and help farmers apply for the WSD: (2)
Normative incentives which were related to the stakeholders’ im-
age in helping the farmers to improve health and safety and reduce
risk to their business. This can be seen as caring for the farmers and
promoting their business/consultancy.
As described earlier, when the WSD scheme was launched two
types of courses could give access to it. FarmSafe and the afﬁliated
trainers preferred their own courses because they perceived them
to be more thorough and because they received payments that
were four times higher. However, this type of payment ceased in
2010 and hence so did the incentive for the FarmSafe trainers to
promote the courses. FarmSafe trainers did not begin to promote
the WSD workshop but were happy to run the workshop when
the ﬁnancial advisor had gathered a group:
‘‘Unfortunately, there’s not a great amount of money behind WSD
to actually be motivated to go out and actually make it happen
whereas Plans there was a lot more money behind it. It means that
you are more motivated to go out and actually pull them [the farm-
ers] together to do them [FarmSafe courses]. Personally I haven’t
been motivated to go out and get on the phone and actually pull
groups together because there’s not enough money in it for me to
do that. Whereas he’s [the ﬁnancial advisor] got the client list right
there and he’s got them coming together to talk about other
things.’’(FarmSafe trainer 2)
The primary incentive for the FarmSafe trainers to promote
WSD was the payment for running the courses. The ﬁnancial advi-
sor considered the connection between the FarmSafe courses and
the WSD to be weak, as many of his clients had taken some Farm-
Safe courses but had not learned about the WSD. This could be a
consequence of weak economic incentives for the FarmSafe train-
ers to promote the WSD scheme.
The opportunity to expand consultancy by including help to
farmers that wanted to complete WSD self-assessment forms
was an additional incentive for FarmSafe trainer 1, who had close
proximity to his network. However, FarmSafe trainer 2 mentioned
that farmers went home with the intension of ﬁnalising the self-
assessment form but often did not get around doing it. It was con-
sidered to be too costly for him to travel far in order to help them
and the farmers were not willing to pay for it. Thus there was no
ﬁnancial incentive for the trainers to make sure farmers applied
for the WSD after the course.
An additional driver for FarmSafe trainers was that they wanted
to inﬂuence farmers to prevent injuries and make farming safer:
People like myself and FarmSafe believe that. . . it’s not just a job, it’s
actually trying to improve. . . There are a lot of people in the industry
and if you can encourage them to take an interest in preserving health
and safety, then we’ve gained something. . ..’’ (FarmSafe trainer 2).
From 2010 ﬁnancial advisors began to promote the WSD dis-
count and organise WSD workshops (FarmSafe manager and trai-
ner 1). The ﬁnancial advisor’s core business was to reduce cost
and risk to his clients. His motivation to promote theWSD was that
he considered it to be an additional product he could offer his cli-
ents. He perceived being associated with theWSD as promotion for
his business: ‘‘It’s good for our business. You’re putting your brand
against something that’s positive and if you do that, that’s actually
good for your branding’’. The Financial advisor also had a personal
motivation to promote safety and theWSD in agriculture: ‘‘. . .we’ve
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Fig. 3. The WSD programme development and delivery in the agriculture industry.
Table 4
Numbers of farmers in WSD 2007–2012.
Levy year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Numbers of farmers in WSDa 460 777 903 989 1045 957
Approximate percentage of farmers in WSD of eligible agriculture businessesb 0.5% 0.9% 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1%
a Data obtained from ACC, 1 May 2013.
b The approximate numbers of eligible agriculture business (84,900) is obtained from (Accident Compensation Corporation, ND).
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cure it because we care. The last thing I want to see is one of my farm-
ing friends hurt or their kids hurt or worse that we have someone on
the farm killed. . .As a ﬁrm, we help our client base and the general
public at large, it’ll come back to us in positive ways from somebody
so I think it’s just good PR.’’
The ﬁnancial advisor charged each participant NZ$ 100 for the
WSD workshop. This covered more than the cost of organising
the workshop and can also be seen as a (self-introduced) economic
incentive to promote the WSD.
The ACC agriculture manager mentioned that ACC was consid-
ering ﬁnding ways of supporting FarmSafe trainers to visit the
farmers: ‘‘We’re looking at ways in which we can make economic
sense of that for them [FarmSafe trainers] to visit the farm but it’s a
difﬁcult one. Obviously if you tried to visit every farm in New Zealand
it would be far too much. But we think while we can visit a few, espe-
cially common types of incidents, get that knowledge [about the cau-
ses]and share that with the wider community then we are doing the
right thing’’. This was mentioned in relation to ACC using FarmSafe
trainers to analyse the causes of farm incidents.
4.3.2. Transformational activities
As described earlier, ACC promoted the WSD scheme to all eli-
gible farmers through letters. However FarmSafe was also ex-
pected to promote and run courses, and through that recruit
farmers to the scheme as a reward for attending the courses and
implementing the knowledge they gained on the courses. FarmSafe
and the individual trainers realised that the farmers did not join
the courses or the WSD scheme on the basis of the general infor-
mation. They therefore developed a series of recruitment strategies
which stood out as their main contribution to the transformation
of the scheme. At the same time recruitment to the courses became
a goal in itself and the WSD an incentive, whereas the goal of
recruiting to the WSD scheme weakened. An overview of the strat-
egies is outlined in Table 5. The sections below consider in more
detail the recruitment strategies and the mechanisms used to
motivate farmers to take the courses and join the WSD.
4.3.2.1. Trainers’ development of strategies. FarmSafe ﬁrst promoted
WSD through advertisement campaigns and direct mail to farmers.
These channels did not give many contacts (FarmSafe Manager).
FarmSafe regional coordinators and trainers subsequently tele-
phoned farmers on the Farmsafe course register in their local areas
to encourage attendance at FarmSafe plans courses. The WSD dis-
count was used to encourage farmers to attend this course in the
ﬁrst place (FarmSafe trainer 1):
‘‘All we really had to do was to ring them up and say: ‘‘Look, you’ve
done this. If you follow this on, at the end of the Plans course you
can actually apply for the safety discount’’ and of course, that
was a big carrot for them to come along. They could see they were
going to get a 10% discount.’’
To gain further out-reach FarmSafe trainers used other argu-
ments that could be categorised as mechanisms related to punish-
ment, economic beneﬁts and other incentives. As an example of the
punishment mechanism the trainers highlighted that it would be
more likely that Department of Labour would prosecute them if
they did not have an OHS plan (FarmSafe trainers 1 and 2), and that
if the farmer had an injury he would not only be injured and incur
time off work, or potentially could die, but furthermore the family
could also go out of business and lose their lifestyle (Agriculture
programme manager, FarmSafe trainer 3). As an example of the
economic beneﬁt FarmSafe trainer 1 told his client group how
other farmers had implemented FarmSafe plans and experienced
that their farm ran more efﬁciently afterwards. An example of an-
other incentive mechanism was the opportunity to socialise with
other farmers during the course. FarmSafe trainer 3 also focused
on the farmers’ desire to be seen as a decent employer, and the
negative impact an injury could have on the farm:
‘‘The other thing is the message we try to get through is: ‘‘Don’t do
any of this stuff because 1) you’re going to get a 10% discount and
2) because you’re worried about the Department of Labour... or
ACC. You do it because you don’t want anybody injured and what
affects somebody being injured is productivity and proﬁtability.’’
All FarmSafe trainers saw Farmers’ low literacy as a barrier for
attending courses and for ﬁlling in the self-assessment form. Fur-
ther, they saw the design of the self-assessment form as a barrier.
This was supported by the ﬁve farmers’ perception of the form. To
overcome this barrier FarmSafe trainer 1 offered his assistance
with ﬁlling in the form, which the interviewed farmers made use
of. The other two FarmSafe trainers did not use this strategy. Farm-
Safe trainer 3 had attempted to inﬂuence how the self-assessment
should be revised, but found that it was difﬁcult to get his views
through with the ACC WSD programme manager.
4.3.2.2. A ﬁnancial advisor’s development of strategies. The ﬁnancial
advisor became an intermediary in late 2010 after attending a
meeting with ACC. Financial advisors provide insurance and other
ﬁnancial advice to businesses. This ﬁnancial advisor had many
small farmers as clients.
Table 5
Recruitment strategies developed by the intermediaries in agriculture.
Intermediary Recruitment strategy Mechanism to make farmers attend courses and/or join
WSD
Results (relative to the different
strategies)
FarmSafe Advertisements Advertisements are read and knowledge about scheme is
sufﬁcient for recruitment
Limited enrolment on courses –
inexpensive
Direct mail Advertisements are read and knowledge about scheme is
sufﬁcient for recruitment
Limited enrolment on courses –
inexpensive
Telephone calls to FarmSafe contacts Personal contact more convincing. Incentive: 10%
discount




Networking Personal relation more binding. Motivators: 10%
discount, increased efﬁciency, opportunity to socialise,
lower risk of prosecution, prevention of injuries and
adverse economic impact




Networking with clients Charged a fee for the
workshop
Personal relation more binding. The fee signals quality
and would be wasted if not attending. Motivators: 10%
discount, help with application, opportunity to socialise
Higher enrolment in WSD workshops
and application for WSD discount –
but time consuming
Networking with accountants and banks Personal relation more binding. Trust in existing
business relations
Higher enrolment in WSD workshop
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He contacted his farmer clients and informed them about the
possibility of saving 10% of the ACC levy if they attended the
WSD workshop and completed the self-assessment which he
would then deliver to ACC. Before this formal contact, whilst duck
hunting with his farming friends he asked them if they had heard
about WSD. None of them had – even though two out of ten had
been on Farm Safe courses. This ‘‘informal survey’’ was the basis
for him getting involved in promoting the WSD. The ﬁnancial advi-
sor organised FarmSafe to run the WSD workshop and an ACC con-
sultant to attend and collect the self-assessment forms. He
emphasised the importance of having a lunch at the end of the
workshop as an opportunity to meet and socialise with other farm-
ers. He believed that charging a fee for the workshop was impor-
tant to increase the perception of the workshops’ quality and
importance. The FarmSafe manager and trainer 3 believed that
the ﬁnancial advisor reached farmers that they would not be able
to reach, because: ‘‘when a ﬁnancial advisor suggests that they attend
a course then it must be of economic beneﬁt to them’’ (FarmSafe trai-
ner 3). Still, the ﬁnancial advisor was surprised that it was so difﬁ-
cult to motivate farmers to attend the workshops. The ﬁnancial
advisor also promoted the WSD through accountants he knew in
order to gain further out-reach. In addition, he had encouraged
some rural banks to promote the WSD to farmers, considering it
to be good business for the bank and the farmers.
The ﬁnancial advisor had SB clients in other industries that
were eligible for the WDS scheme. However since he did not know
training providers in these industries he did not know how to go
about it. In contrast, it was easy for him to organise the WSD work-
shop in agriculture because the FarmSafe manager was his per-
sonal friend.
The ﬁnancial advisor built on his personal relationships to farm-
ers when he explored the market for the WSD workshops and his
personal relation to other stakeholders when he recruited and
organised the WDS workshop and the applications for the WSD
scheme. He also found that he had to change the farmers’ negative
perception of ACC. Many farmers only saw the levy side of ACC and
did not see that there were possible beneﬁts, such as the WSD.
4.3.3. Opportunities to use other Intermediaries
During the interviews other potential intermediaries were men-
tioned. FarmSafe trainer 1 mentioned that he had helped more cli-
ents to set up OHS systems or plans and to apply for the WSD
because the big corporates demanded it of the farmers. Farmer 1
mentioned that they had a more developed OHS system which
was required by Global G.A.P. (Good Agriculture Practice) and that
they were audited annually by Global G.A.P. ‘‘. . .from an audit point
of view we have to do more [for the Global Gap then for the WSD].
Way more and they’re more proactive and see that we are actually
doing what we should be doing compliance wise [for Global Gab]’’.
(Global G.A.P. is an NGO organisation that sets voluntary standards
for the certiﬁcation of agriculture products which include safe pro-
duction methods).
5. Discussion
This study shows that ACC had reasonably advanced recruit-
ment strategies (involving NGO industry OHS training providers)
in their programme theory but limited consideration of intermedi-
ary incentives. The analysis illustrates how a governmental body
owning an OHS incentive scheme reached out with some success
to a part of the SB target group by building a programme theory
that involved an NGO OHS training provider with close relation
to local business community as intermediary. However this suc-
cess was restricted by focusing on one type of intermediary and
the programme owners’ limited consideration of the incentives
for the intermediaries to promote and deliver the programme.
These ﬁndings are discussed below in more detail and in relation
to the two research questions.
5.1. How do Intermediaries contribute to the transformation of the
programme theory (the understanding of the context and the
mechanism)?
Whether the intermediaries change the main understanding of
the mechanism that should make farmers improve OHS is debat-
able. If the mechanism was to bring knowledge through courses
to the farmers so that they would make changes because they
are good employers, then the intermediaries did not change this
central mechanism. All intermediaries focused on getting farmers
to take either the courses or attend the workshop. However the
ﬁnancial advisor focused more on making the farmers apply for
the discount. This leads to the conclusion that the intermediaries
focused on the mechanism that is most likely to further their
own interests.
The mechanism that should make the Farmers attend courses
was maintained as an economic incentive by using the 10% dis-
count. Some of the more peripheral mechanisms like the time
spent on courses and the course fees were altered slightly by the
different intermediaries. Further, other arguments or mechanisms
were included to motivate the farmers to take the courses and
make changes. These were related to punishment - like prosecu-
tion if they had an accident and could not show that they had an
OHS system/plan in place, other economic beneﬁts and social ben-
eﬁts – like networking. The introduction of these mechanisms
were all based on the intermediaries’ deeper experience and
understanding of the farming community, but were not considered
by the programme designer (ACC).
The main contribution of the intermediaries was in the transfor-
mation of the recruitment strategy. The two different types of
intermediaries used networking as the main strategy, but reached
different segments of the target group because their networks
were based on different businesses areas – OHS consultancy and
ﬁnancial advice. Further, the ﬁnancial advisor used his personal
network to banks and accountants to widen the target group for
his promotion of the WSD and the workshops.
The above interpretation of the ﬁndings conﬁrms the impor-
tance of including trusted intermediaries in the dissemination of
OHS programmes emphasised in previous research (Hasle and Lim-
borg, 2006; James et al., 2004; Legg et al., 2010).
5.2. What factors inﬂuenced intermediaries’ transformation of the
programme?
The initial ACC campaigns did not result in a large uptake but
the training provider and the trainers were able to develop a pro-
motion strategy that better ﬁtted and reached their networks.
Their promotion strategy and effort were inﬂuenced by the ﬁnan-
cial incentive built into the programme. The incentive was mainly
linked to funding of training courses by another governmental
authority. This resulted in a transformation of theWSD programme
into a training programme and the WSD discount was seen as a
vehicle to recruit participants to courses. When the ﬁnancial incen-
tive ended so did the effort of the trainers to promote the courses.
This illustrates the strength and the risk of relying of funding from
sources outside of the control of the owner of the programme. The
intermediaries only committed themselves if they considered the
programme beneﬁcial for their organisational and personal goals.
One of the reasons for the limited uptake in the scheme may there-
fore be a lack of active promotion of the WSD scheme and of help
to enter the scheme by the trainers.
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It can therefore be concluded that ACC’s programme theory
lacked considerations regarding the intermediaries’ interest in
the scheme and an understanding of how this interest inﬂuenced
the scheme. This was a development which on one hand proved
innovation in recruitment but on the other hand changed the
direction of the scheme into a training effort. This case study there-
fore indicates that economic incentives operate as strong motiva-
tors for the intermediaries, and that the programme owner needs
to consider the possible mechanisms underlying the incentives
for the intermediaries. The ACC agriculture industry manager
seemed to have been made aware of this late in the process and
was considering incentives for the FarmSafe trainers to contact
farmers at the farm, but this was assessed as being too expensive.
This highlights the difﬁculties that exist with implementation of
OHS programmes through personal contacts to the SB owner, and
is consistent with previous research ﬁndings (Hasle et al.,
2012a,b; Hasle and Limborg, 2006).
However, even though it is important to secure funding for inter-
mediaries, there may be types of intermediaries that have an inter-
est in promoting the intervention program without direct and
explicit funding, because they see it as a way of expanding their
own business. Such an observation ﬁts with earlier research into
accountants’ interest in OHS advice to SBs (Hasle et al., 2010). To
make use of such opportunities the programme owner needs to ap-
proach intermediaries and demonstrate how they can beneﬁt from
engaging with the programme, as ACC did when organising meet-
ingswith ﬁnancial advisors. The study also illustrates the advantage
of disseminating a programme using different types of intermediar-
ies including some that relate to the business side of SBs. The ﬁnan-
cial advisor reached a new segment of the target group. This strategy
only worked because he had personal contact with the training pro-
vider. It did notwork for him in relation to his clients in other indus-
tries because he did not know the programme infrastructure. Thus it
is important for the programme owner to make the infrastructure
clear to all involved intermediaries.
The close relation between intermediaries and the target group
is another factor that both inﬂuenced the intermediaries’ engage-
ment in the programme and their ability to engage with the target
group. The trainers and the ﬁnancial advisor were all passionate
about improving safety in farming and had a trusting relation to
a large group of their farming clients. They had all been part of
the farming community. Thus it seems important that the pro-
gramme designer gives priority to developing and maintaining a
close relationship with the intermediaries in the sector, and that
this also opens up opportunity for feedback that can be used to
evaluate and revise the programme.
Even though the WSD scheme was designed in accordance with
current knowledge about SBs, it had a limited outreach. A closer
analysis by ACC of different possible intermediaries at the begin-
ning of the programme could perhaps have led to the selection of
a wider range of intermediaries, who could reach more segments
of the SB target group. In the case of the WSD they could have in-
volved the large farming corporates and Global G.A.P., who require
OHS systems or plans of their suppliers andmembers. The opportu-
nity to involve key actors in the supply chain, like large costumers
and certiﬁcation organisations, have been identiﬁed and discussed
in earlier research (Olsen et al., 2010; Walters, 2006) but has not
been used as a strategy for the dissemination of national OHS inter-
ventions. As for most other SB programmes, it seems necessary to
base the design of OHS intervention schemes on a broad spectrum
of activities using a variety of intermediaries that can supplement
each other in reaching a larger proportion of SBs.
It was not possible in this study to assess the effect of the WSD
on the work environment in the SBs that joined the scheme. As in
other OHS interventions (Hasle et al., 2010) the designer of the
intervention did not evaluate the effect on the working environ-
ment. In the case of theWSD, the random audits could be an option
to assess the effect of the scheme on SBs’ OHS management and
work environment.
This paper has presented the results of the case study on one
OHS incentive programme in one sector in New Zealand. The case
study was built on a selection of actors on the basis of their differ-
ent experiences with the programme. Thus the ﬁndings may not
have identiﬁed all the ways in which intermediaries could inﬂu-
ence OHS programmes and the programme theory or all the factors
that could inﬂuence the intermediaries’ engagement in OHS pro-
grammes. There may therefore be other mechanisms for the
involvement of intermediaries and for their relations with the tar-
get group. However the study still illustrates factors that need to be
considered when designing an OHS programme and choosing
intermediaries to disseminate it i.e. the context of the intermediar-
ies and the mechanisms that should make them promote and
encourage SBs to join an OHS scheme.
6. Conclusion
This study indicates that intermediaries are driven by their own
interest in an OHS scheme, such as the WSD, and this determines
their role in the schemes’ transformation, implementation and dis-
semination. Both economic and normative incentives that align
with their business interests drive the intermediaries’ contribution.
Economic incentives particularly inﬂuenced the trainers’ trans-
formation of the WSD into a training scheme while funding for the
courses was high and could support their personal promotion of
training courses. When the economic incentive changed and was
linked to the numbers of completed WSD applications the trainers’
role changed to delivering workshops that resulted in the comple-
tion of applications.
Normative incentives (e.g. to be associated with a reputational
scheme and to provide clients with a product that could save
money) were particularly a driver for the ﬁnancial advisor. His pro-
motion was linked directly to the WSD and the training became a
means to achieve the discount.
The intermediaries’ knowledge of the target group was based on
their interaction with a segment of the target group and was used
to transform the recruitment strategy: the way the target group
was contacted and the arguments used to persuade them to partic-
ipate. The different intermediaries reached different segments of
the target group.
The WSD scheme is an example of an insurance discount
scheme for SBs that has reached out to the target group and
achieved a certain but rather low uptake. The promotion of the
scheme depended on intermediaries and the inclusion of elements
which provided ﬁnancial or other beneﬁts to intermediaries. The
study identiﬁed other NGOs (large corporates and voluntary certi-
ﬁcation schemes) related to the supply chain that could have been
considered as intermediaries in the WSD scheme to reach out to
other segments of the target group.
The ﬁndings in this study can be used strategically by pro-
gramme designers to reach a larger proportion of SBs. Programme
designers should allocate resources to different types of intermedi-
aries that ﬁt with their speciﬁc needs and organisational interests.
Analysis of intermediaries’ business goals should form the basis for
their role in the programme and for allocating resources.
It is important to further develop our understanding of the
mechanisms which can motivate intermediaries to participate in
OHS intervention programmes for SBs. This could be achieved by
conducting more case studies of similar programmes in other
sectors and other types of OHS intervention programmes. Further
studies also need to evaluate the effects of these kinds of
programmes on the working environment in SBs and their relation
to the intermediaries’ role.
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